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The legitimacy and viability of using force for liberal ends ± protecting peace agreements, 
reducing lawless violence, defending human rights, relieving human suffering, spreading 
democracy ± has stoked fierce controversy since the end of the Cold War.1 Yet what is often 
forgotten in debates regarding the use of force for liberal ends is that such questions are 
FRQIURQWHGQRWRQO\E\WKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJOLEHUDOGHPRFUDFLHV, but also by some of its poorest 
and youngest. Through participation in United Nations (UN) and regional peacekeeping 
operations, many developing countries have also confronted these questions. Indeed, since US 
3UHVLGHQW%DUDFN2EDPD¶VGUDZLQJGRZQRI86 forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the global 
deployment of UN peacekeepers now exceeds that of US forces deployed to combat zones, 
with the overwhelming majority of these peacekeepers coming from developing countries 
rather than the global democratic core of Western NATO states.2  
 
While there has been plenty of literature discussing the effects of peacekeeping on the countries 
in which peacekeepers are deployed, the effects of prolonged and repeated peacekeeping on 
the countries deploying the peacekeepers has been almost entirely ignored. One of the few 
candidates for this role is DQ LQIOXHQWLDO VWUDQG RI WKRXJKW WKDW , KDYH GXEEHG µdemocratic 
diversionary peacekeeping¶KHQFHIRUZDUGDDP).3 This theory suggests that participation in 
peacekeeping stimulates democracy in peacekeeper-contributing states.4 Guided by the logic 
of purposive sampling, this article offers an investigation of three cases that contradict this 
theory ± namely, Bangladesh, Fiji, The Gambia. In all three cases, participation in UN and / or 
regional peacekeeping operations has been credited with contributing to the military seizure of 
power. SSHFLILFDOO\LQ%DQJODGHVK¶VPRVWUHFHQWERXWRIPLOLWDU\JRYHUQPHQW-08), in 
)LML¶VF\FOHRIFRXSVVLQFHand in instigating the regime of Yahya Jammeh  in The Gambia 
(1994-2017). 
 
Thus the puzzle motivating this article is to explore how the use of force for liberal 
internationalist purposes might have helped to produce illiberal and anti-democratic results in 
these three countries. The discussion in this article carries two overlapping aims. The first aim 
is to probe the limits of the theoretical association between peacekeeping and democracy 
through the examination of these three countries. The second aim is to deploy these extreme 
cases in heuristic fashion, in order to derive more generalizable insights and hypotheses 
regarding the possibly damaging recursive effects of military deployments abroad on 
developing democracies. The article finds plenty of grounds for scepticism regarding any 
putative link between peacekeeping abroad and democracy at home. It also finds that 
SHDFHNHHSLQJPD\UHQGHUVWDWHV¶PRUHSHUPHDEOHWRH[WHUQDOLQIOXHQFHDQGWKDWSHDFHNHHSLQJ
may enable military forces to sustain their size and power in states making the journey from 
military rule.  
 
Research Design and Methodological Remarks 
 
This article is organised around probing the limits of the association between peacekeeping and 
democracy through the selection of three theory-infirming case studies. In other words, I have 
explicitly selected on the extreme value of the dependent variable (namely, military rule 
resulting from undertaking peacekeeping operations abroad, the latter being the independent 
variable). As peacekeeping is already established as a cause of military rule in these cases, here 
the focus of investigation is on re-evaluating and cross-comparing the role played by 
peacekeeping in these outcomes.  
 
While interesting in and of themselves, what is more important is that these extreme cases have 
a heuristic potential to generate insights regarding the possible collateral effects of 
peacekeeping on peacekeeper-contributing states. After all, the domestic political costs of 
military deployments abroad might be burdensome and damaging even if they fall short of 
outright military rule. By studying extreme cases we may be able to identify warning signs 
regarding the risk of the military skewing democratic political functioning as a result of 
participation in multinational missions abroad. Thus although the case selection involves a 
PRVWGLIIHUHQWV\VWHPVGHVLJQWKHIXQFWLRQRIWKHFRPSDULVRQLVµOHVVWRVLPXODWHH[SHULPHQW
WKDQWRVWLPXODWHLPDJLQDWLRQ¶XVLQJLWDVµDV\VWHPIRUTXHVWLRQLQJQRWDQVZHULQJ¶5The stakes 
of this investigation should not therefore be seen as being restricted to these countries, or indeed 
merely to identifying the potential for regression from democracy to military rule as a result of 
deploying security forces abroad. Rather the investigation may help us better understand the 
possibility for µilliberal statebuilding¶HPHUJLQJ even in democratic and democratising regimes 
DV D UHVXOW RI D FRXQWU\¶V VHFXULW\ UHODWLRQVKLSV ZLWK H[WHUQDO DFWRUV DQG LQVWLWXWLRQV6 The 
findings should also contribute to the literature on the diversionary use of force in general.7  
The article does this by conducting a literature-assessing study of peacekeeping and military 
rule in these three cases, which is then followed by bringing ng these literatures into dialogue 
with each other, alongside analysis of primary sources (primarily WikiLeaks documents) 
supplemented with expert and elite interviews.  
 
Scope and Contribution 
 
As has already been noted above, while there are many studies of the outcomes of peace 
operations iQµSRVW-FRQIOLFW¶FRXQWULHVWKHUHare far fewer considering the possible impact of 
such efforts on peacekeeper-contributing states.8 This investigation therefore helps to expand 
the study of the unintended consequences of peacekeeping IURPWKHLPSDFWRQWKHµSHDFHNHSW¶
to possible feedback effects on the peacekeepers themselves. It is also important to clarify what 
the article is not trying to do. This article does not seek to explain the role of peacekeeping in 
instigating coups in general, or the impact of military operations abroad on democratic 
institutions in general, or even the impact of participating in peacekeeping on domestic 
institutions. Rather the aim is to (1) establish how significant (and in what way significant) 
peacekeeping participation was in instigating military rule in Bangladesh, Fiji, The Gambia; 
(2) to see if any common patterns emerge from these three cases; and (3) to consider what the 
potential implications of these findings patterns are in terms of possible negative feedback 
effects of peacekeeping on peacekeeper-contributor states. Before embarking on the 
investigation, it is worth noting that this article assumes that the depredations of military as 




The article proceeds as follows. We begin by considering the putative relationship between 
peacekeeping and democracy, and move to consider the strengths and weaknesses of DDP, and 
the variables through which it is supposed to function. The lack of systematic conceptual 
elaboration within the theory is noted. We then turn to consider the link between peacekeeping 
and military interference in politics, working through the cases of Bangladesh and Fiji before 
turning to The Gambia. As these latter two cases are both connected to the 1990-97 Ecomog 
mission in Liberia, for the sake of brevity they are discussed together. The next section distils 
common patterns from the cases, before moving in the penultimate section of the article to 
identify several variables that might carry negative feedback effects from peacekeeping abroad 
back to the home state, providing the basis for possible generalisation further afield.  
 Democratic Diversion Through Peacekeeping 
 
Participation in peacekeeping is strongly associated with liberal democracy in the scholarly 
literature. Military sociologist Charles Moskos holds that participation in peacekeeping helps 
to HQJHQGHUDQGVROLGLI\OLEHUDOGHPRFUDWLFQRUPVZLWKLQQDWLRQV¶PLOLWDU\IRUFHV. IR theorists 
KDYHKDLOHGSHDFHNHHSLQJDVSDUDGLJPDWLFRIDQHZPRGHORIµFRVPRSROLWDQODZ-HQIRUFHPHQW¶
based on global policing of human rights rather than traditional strategic pursuit of national 
interests by military means.10 Other scholars have found participation in peacekeeping 
operations strongly associated with liberal democracy and human rights observance in the 
peacekeeper-contributing states.11 Arturo Sotomayor calls this interlocking structure of 
conceptual linkages and empirical claims across peacebuilding, peacekeeper contribution and 
democratisation efforts WKHµGHPRFUDWLFSHDFHNHHSLQJK\SRWKHVLV¶12 
 
DDP is best seen as a subsidiary claim built into the structure of WKLV ODUJHU µGHPRFUDWLF
SHDFHNHHSLQJ K\SRWKHVLV¶.13 DDP theory can be rendered thus: sending troops abroad to 
participate in peacekeeping can be a type of governing strategy through which democratising 
elites in transitional states and / or youthful democracies seek to strengthen democratic rule by 
deflecting the military through involving them in multinational operations abroad.. Grand 
claims in both theory and policy have been made for diversionary peace: µSDUWicipation in 
SHDFHNHHSLQJRSHUDWLRQVFDQIRUPDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIDQDWLRQ¶VWUDQVLWLRQWRGHPRFUDF\DQG
HIIRUWV WR EULQJ D IRUPHUO\ DXWRQRPRXV PLOLWDU\ XQGHU FLYLOLDQ FRQWURO¶ (e.g., Argentina)14 
Deploying on peacekeeping missions has been touted as a meanV RI µWDPLQJ¶ PLOLWDULHV LQ
extent dictatorships (The Gambia), as well as those militaries accused of rampaging in on-
going conflicts (Mexico).15 DDP has also underpinned decisions on significant quantities of 
military aid (Nigeria).16  At its grandest diversionary peace could even be seen as a form of 
µJOREDO ''5¶ ± that is, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration not only for ex-
belligerents in post-conflict countries but also for troublesome armies from peacekeeper-
contributing countries too, through the process of exporting them to conflict zones and thereby 
absorbing them into liberal structures of global conflict management.17 Given this range of 
claims, let us examine the conceptual structure of the theory in more detail.   
Conceptual Components of Diversionary Peace 
 
Trevor Findlay provides the most succinct statement of DDP:  
 
6WDWHV LQ ZKLFK WKH PLOLWDU\ LV QRW HQWLUHO\ XQGHU FLYLOLDQ FRQWURO « PD\ YLHZ
peacekeeping as a means of keeping their armed forces occupied outside the country 
rather than meddling in domestic affairs and of helping to rehabilitate them after an 
authoritarian era in which their integrity and professionalism were compromised.18 
 
There are several elements worth stressing in this statement. First, Findlay identifies not merely 
ex-military dictatorships as the subject of the claim, but the wider category of states with civil-
military relations skewed to the advantage of the military. Second, DDP is not primarily 
addressed to explaining the effects of peacekeeping participation on peacekeeper-contributing 
states, but rather seeks to explain why states contribute to peacekeeping ± but this explanation 
is offered by reference to the recursive effects of participation in peacekeeping. Third, Findlay 
assumes that it is a civilian and democratically-elected government pursuing greater military 
involvement in peacekeeping in order to benefit from these recursive effects. Finally, Findlay 
offers two types of distinct ± but not necessarily mutually exclusive ± explanatory mechanisms 
as powering these recursive effects. We can term these entanglement µNHHSLQJ WKHLUDUPHG
IRUFHVRFFXSLHGRXWVLGHWKHFRXQWU\¶DQGsocialisation µKHOSLQJWRUHKDELOLWDWHWKHP¶ 
 
Findlay suggests Argentina as an example of the entanglement mechanism.19 Post-Cold War 
GHPRFUDWLVDWLRQLQ3DNLVWDQKDVDOVREHHQOLQNHGYLDGLYHUVLRQDU\SHDFHWRSHDFHNHHSLQJµWKH
political leadership [desires] to keep the army purposefully busy in peace operations abroad, 
so that the fledging constituWLRQDODQGGHPRFUDWLFRUGHULVDOORZHGOHJLWLPDWHVSDFH¶20 Aning 
HFKRHVWKHVHFODLPVZLWKUHJDUGVWR*KDQDDUJXLQJWKDWWKDWFRXQWU\¶VH[WHQVLYHSHDFHNHHSLQJ
µKHOSV NHHS >WKH *KDQDLDQ $UPHG )RUFHV@ ³RQ WUDFN´ DQG DZD\ IURP SRWHQWLDO GRPHVWLF
mXWLQLHV¶21 Several commentators have suggested similar effects at work in Bangladesh, with 
deployments to the UN mission in newly independent South Sudan in 2014 being credited with 
preventing a recurrence of the 2006-7 military-imposed state of emergency.22 Implicit in this 
idea of entanglement is the subsidiary idea of refocusing ± that is, orienting a military outwards 
rather than inwards, a factor heavily stressed by Katherine Worboys in her study of 
GLYHUVLRQDU\SHDFHLQ$UJHQWLQDµDQXQRFFXSLHGPLOLWDUy, with no external threat to address, 
ZRXOGEHPRVWOLNHO\WRLQWHUIHUHLQGRPHVWLFSROLWLFV¶23  
 
With socialisation SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ SHDFHNHHSLQJ VHUYHV DV D PHDQV RI µWDPLQJ¶ SUDHWRULDQ
security forces. Jean-0DULH*XpKHQQRWKH81¶VORQJHVW-serving Under-Secretary General for 
3HDFHNHHSLQJ DUJXHV WKDW µ6HUYLFH ZLWK 81 SHDFHNHHSLQJ « >H[SRVHV@ PLOLWDULHV WR NH\
international norms and standards including human rights training, gender parity, support for 
HOHFWLRQV DQGDGRFWULQH RI FLYLOLDQ FRQWURO¶24 US dLSORPDWV FUHGLW WKH µSRVLWLYHPDFURDQG
PLFURLPSDFWRI81SHDFHNHHSLQJ¶ZLWKKHOSLQJ WRFUHDWHD%DQJODGHVKLPLOLWDU\WKDW LVµLQ
PDQ\ZD\VIDUVXSHULRUWRLWVFLYLOLDQFRXQWHUSDUWV¶DVDUHVXOWRIthe µLQWHUQDWLRQDOH[SRVXUH
and significant economic beneILWV¶ accruing from peacekeeping participation.25 In the words of 
former Argentinean defence minister Oscar Camilión, participation in peacekeeping helps to 
IRVWHU µDQ LQWHUQDWLRQDORXWORRNZKLFK LVYHU\PXFKKHOSLQJ WRFRQVROLGDWH WKHPLOLWDU\DVD
pillar RIWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOV\VWHP¶26 :RUER\VFUHGLWVSHDFHNHHSLQJZLWKKDYLQJFUHDWHGµDQ
HQWLUHO\QHZLGHQWLW\¶IRUWKH$UJHQWLQHDQDUPHGIRUFHVSDUWLFXODUO\LWVVHQLRURIILFHUV± an 
institution hitherto known for murdering 30,000 of their own people during the rule of the junta 
across 1976-83.27 Brazil, Chile, Guatemala and Nigeria have all been cited as examples of 
countries engaging in peacekeeping in order deliberately to remould the military¶VLGHQWLW\28 
Such claims clearly intersect with theories of cosmopolitan peacekeeping and the hope that 
SHDFHNHHSLQJ PLJKW µPDNH \RXQJ RIILFHUV PRUH FRVPRSROLWDQ OHVV QDWLRQDOLVWLF DQG PRUH
UHVLVWDQWWRFDOOVIRUPLOLWDU\³VDOYDWLRQ´YLDFRXS«¶29  
 
A third factor that recurs implicitly in the literature as part of DDP is control. That is, that 
governments push reluctant militaries into peacekeeping as a means of extending civilian 
control over state security agencies and bureaucracies.30 The final element identified in DDP 
accounts of peacekeeping is resources; i.e., UN hard currency reimbursement flowing from 
participation in its peacekeeping operations helps to mollify a military securing a diminishing 
proportion of a national budget or seeking to weather a domestic economic crisis. Argentina is 
again cited as an example of the latter.31 It is important to note that the various factors identified 
above ± entanglement, socialisation, control, resources ± are rarely disentangled and / or are 
seen to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Having examined the theoretical 
architecture of DDP, let us turn to examine the three cases that seem to flout the tenets of the 
theory. Unlike Fiji, Bangladesh has been cited as an example of DDP.  
 
Peacekeepers to Praetorians: Bangladesh, Fiji, and The Gambia  
 
For all their many differences, peacekeeping is something that all these three countries share. 
Fiji has long been a stalwart of both UN and non-UN peacekeeping going back to the 1980s, 
while The Gambia has maintained persistent involvement in regional peacekeeping, dating 
right back to the ill-fated Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring 
Group deployed to Liberia (Ecomog,1990-1997).. Bangladesh also began sending 
peacekeepers abroad at the end of the Cold War and has become one of the predominant post-
Cold War peacekeepers. In these three countries peacekeeping is commonly credited with an 
important role in the military subversion of democracy. The Economist gave peacekeeping 
VXFKDSURPLQHQW UROH LQ)LML¶VSDWWHUQRIPLOLWDU\ FRXSV that the then UN Under-Secretary 
General of Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno accused the Economist RI µLQDFFXUDWHO\¶
LPSO\LQJµWKDWVHUYLFHZLWK81SHDFHNHHSLQJIRUFHVHQFRXUDJHVDQDWWLWXGHRILPSXQLW\DQG
exceptionalism within national military structurHV¶32 So what is the alleged link between coups 
and participation in peacekeeping in these three cases? We begin by considering what happened 
in each of these cases, before moving inductively to a more general level of analysis in the 




As we saw above, heavy Bangladeshi contribution to peacekeeping has frequently been 
explained by reference to the pro-democratic effects of diversionary peace. Bangladeshi 
peacekeeping did indeed coincide with early post-Cold War democratisation, beginning with 
the UN mission that oversaw the end of the 1980-89 Iran-Iraq war.34 General Hussain 
Muhammad Ershad¶VUXOHended in 1990 and the country enjoyed regular, if fraught, elections 
until 2007. Bangladesh consistently appears in the top-three contributing nations every year 
since the turn of the century. Bangladeshi peacekeepers have played such significant 
SHDFHNHHSLQJUROHVLQ$IULFD¶VFRQIOLFWVWKDW6LHUUD/HRQHHYHQGHFODUHG%HQJDOLWKHVHFRQG-
language of the country as a token of gratitude to the efforts of Bangladeshi blue helmets.35  
 
Less propitiously, peacekeeping was also implicated in the 2007-08 state of emergency 
following the so-FDOOHGµVRIWFRXS¶LQHDUO\. 7KHUROHSOD\HGE\SHDFHNHHSLQJLQWKHµVRIW
FRXS¶ZDVPDGHPDQLIHVWLQDWKUHDWLVVXed on January 11 2007 by the UN chief representative 
in the country, Renata Lok Dessallien, to shut Bangladesh out of UN peacekeeping if the 
military allowed disputed elections to go ahead in the face of a boycott by the-then opposition 
Awami League.36 Of this episode the Economist REVHUYHG µ7KH LQWHUYHQWLRQ >E\ WKH 81
resident representative] was strange on the face of it, because the UN is not known to go around 
LQFLWLQJDUP\WDNHRYHUV¶37 The military placed the country under a state of emergency the very 
same day as the Dessallien statement was issued. The significance of the UN involvement can 
be gauged by the fact that iWZDV'HVVDOOLHQ¶VSXEOLFVWDWHPHQWWKDWPLOLWDU\RIILFHUVFDUULHG
ZLWK WKHPZKHQ WKH\ZHQW WR WKH LQFXPEHQWSUHVLGHQW ,DMXGGLQ$KPHG¶V office, physically 
DVVDXOWHGWKHSUHVLGHQW¶VDGYLVHUDQGDFWLQJPLQLVWHURIVWDWH, Mukhles Chowdhury, before they 
forced Ahmed to resign ± at gunpoint, according to Chowdhury.38 
 
The UN later WKUHDWHQHGWKHPLOLWDU\¶VDFFHVVWRSHDFHNHHSLQJ again, this time to mould the 
progress of the military regime by inducing it to hold the suspended elections.39 In the most 
recent elections, speculation has been rife in Bangladesh as to whether the UN would intervene 
in the political process by once again using the tool of peacekeeping to manipulate the 
military.40  Peacekeeping thus provided leverage to external actors to intervene in the 
Bangladeshi democratic process through the medium of the UN and the military. The questions 
that follow then, are how and why did peacekeeping provide leverage, and to what end?  
 
In terms of the how, the dependence of the Bangladeshi military on peacekeeping gave the UN 
leverage over the single most powerful actor in Bangladeshi politics ± powerful because armed 
and well-versed in political interference.41 In terms of why peacekeeping could provide 
leverage, all agree that peacekeeping constitutes a significant revenue stream for the 
Bangladeshi military.42 One study estimates annual Bangladeshi net income from 
peacekeeping rising from roughly $23 million to $110 million over the course of the last 
decade, while Zaman and Biswas estimate Bangladeshi earnings from peacekeeping as 
constituting eight per cent of total Bangladeshi remittances across the 2008-11 period.43 
AccoUGLQJ WR WKH %DQJODGHVKL DUP\¶V RZQ LQWHUQDO GRFXPHQWV JURVV FRPSHQVDWLRQ DFURVV
2001-10 amounted to $1.28 billion.44 Moreover, there is good evidence to suggest that 
peacekeeping continues to constitute a substantial revenue for individuals within the 
Bangladeshi military despite ± and perhaps even because of ± significant economic growth.45 
&LWLQJ µD UHSUHVHQWDWLYH %DQJODGHVKL SHDFHNHHSHU¶ WKH Economist notes that the officer in 
question netted savings of 2m taka (US$30,000 - enough to buy two plots of land in 
%DQJODGHVKIURPDRQH\HDUWRXULQ&{WHG¶,YRLUHµ+HGHVFULEHVWKHWRXUDVKLVSHQVLRQIXQG
D UHZDUG IRU  \HDUV RI VHUYLFH¶46 Earnings from peacekeeping can also be parlayed into 
µventure capital¶ for military-sponsored economic projects.47  
 
While the UN role appears to have been decisive, there is little reason to think that it was the 
UN¶V'HSDUWPHQWRI3HDFHNHHSLQJ2SHUDWLRQV'3.2itself that was driving the coup. After 
all, if electoral instability in Bangladesh was so threatening to the global reputation of UN 
peacekeeping, then DPKO could hardly credibly have threatened to slash its Bangladeshi 
peacekeepers as a means of inducing stability in the country.48 Whether or not the coup leaders 
thought the UN threat credible, they clearly felt DeVVDOOLHQ¶VVWDWHPHQWQHFHVVDU\WRMXVWLI\WKH
seizure of power. WikiLeaks cables suggest that the military leadership were sufficiently 
reluctant to intervene that they were soliciting public statements from the UN representative in 
Bangladesh warning that military intervention in the electoral process would threaten 
Bangladeshi peacekeeping.49 Evidently the coup leaders felt UN threats, however credible, 
were necessary. The possibility of being barred from peacekeeping allegedly played an 
important role in swaying the military rank and file to support the insurgent leadership.50  
 
WikiLeaks cables show Dessallien took significant individual initiative in intensifying 
international pressure on Bangladesh, with the connivance of major Western states.51 Although 
the coup itself seems to have taken Western states by surprise,52 they gave significant support 
WR WKH PLOLWDU\ UHJLPH IRU LWV GXUDWLRQ SHUKDSV IDFLOLWDWHG E\ WKH IDFW WKDW WKH µVWDWH RI
HPHUJHQF\¶ QRPLQDOO\ DYRLGHG H[WUD-constitutional dictatorship ± (against which Western 
diplomats repeatedly warned military leaders in discussions prior to the coup.53) Emergency 
rule in Bangladesh never drew the kind of public criticism that the 2014 coup in Thailand has 
for instance despite the fact that there were significant Western concerns attached to the 2007 
elections.54 The corruption of the incumbent government of Khaleda Zia, its perceived 
tolerance of Islamism and refusal to accommodate opposition demands were seen respectively 
WRWKUHDWHQGRQRUQDWLRQV¶ µLQYHVWPHQWV¶LQ%DQJODGHVKLGHYHORSPHQWWKHZDURQWHUURULQWKH
wider region, and to raise the prospect of spiralling destabilisation and possible civil war.55 
Whatever the precise proximate causes and instigators of the coup, the dependence of the 
Bangladeshi military on peacekeeping facilitated the military seizure of power and externally-
driven manipulation of Bangladeshi politics without recourse to more politically costly forms 
of interference whose effect would only be felt over time, e.g., slashing aid to an aid-dependent 
country or having to overcome the resistance of multinational garment manufacturers in order 





until 2007) means that DDP has never been seen as applicable to Fiji.57 Indeed, quite the 
opposite.58 According to the literature, peacekeeping propelled the growth of the Fijian armed 
forces, the Royal Fijian Military Forces (RFMF, VLQFHUHQDPHGWKH5HSXEOLFRI)LML¶V0LOLWDU\
)RUFHV IROORZLQJ )LML¶V SRVW-coup expulsion from the Commonwealth in September 2009). 
Peacekeeping is a major foreign exchange earner for Fiji as well as a source of national pride 
for the military.59 Stewart Frith and Jon Fraenkel summarise this:  
 
Peacekeeping for the United Nations did most to stimulate the growth of the force. 
>«@The overall effect has been to boost the morale of officers and troops ± especially 
when they are on operational duty ± DQGWRSURIHVVLRQDOL]HWKH5)0)«7\SLFDOO\)LML¶V
leading military officers have been better educated and more articulate than many of 
)LML¶VFLYLOLDQSROLWLFLDQV60 
 
Frith and Fraenkel estimated )LML¶VWRWDOHDUQLQJVIURPSHDFHNHHSLQJDFURVV-2009 as $300 
million.61 Fijians have also participated on non-UN peacekeeping missions in the Pacific as 
well as with the post-Camp David peacekeeping force in Sinai.62 More recently, Fijians also 
provided HOLWHWURRSVIRUWKHµJXDUGs XQLW¶GHSOR\HGWRact as bodyguards for officials serving 
with the UNAMI political mission in Iraq.63 Indeed the Department of Peacekeeping 
2SHUDWLRQVZDVJLYHQIRUHZDUQLQJRIWKHPLOLWDU\¶VLQWHQWLRQWRVHL]HSRZHUZLWKWKHUHVult that 
the UN encouraged the Fijian military to desist ± to no avail.64   
 
7KH %DQJODGHVKL PLOLWDU\ ZDV IDPLOLDU ZLWK WKH FRXS G¶pWDW ORQJ EHIRUH WKH\ EHJDQ
peacekeeping.65 ,Q)LMLSHDFHNHHSLQJLVPRUHLQWLPDWHO\OLQNHGWRWKDWFRXQWU\¶VWUDGLWLRQRI
putschism. On top of the link between peacekeeping and military size and revenue, Andrew 
Scobell identifies several other factors resulting from peacekeeping that fed into )LML¶VKLVWRU\
of coups. 6FREHOODUJXHVWKDWSHDFHNHHSLQJIDPLOLDULVHG)LML¶Vpeacekeepers with the concerns 
of Western militaries, notably with respect to fears of the spread of communism. Furthermore, 
FLML¶V SHDFHNHHSHUV experience of inter-communal strife in Lebanon gave them a new 
SHUVSHFWLYH RQ WKHLU RZQ LVODQGV¶ 0HODQHVLDQ DQG Indian ethnic rivalries (the army being 
predominantly Melanesian). The 1987 coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka consequently came to see 
WKH PLOLWDU\ µDV WKH DUELWHU RI JRYHUQPHQWV DQG JXDUGLDQ RI WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ¶66 Jone 
Baledrokadroka (himself an ex-Fijian officer and exile) emphasises how Fijian officers 
developed an identity based around supra-political authority as a result of their peacekeeping 
experience. This was down to the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon in particular, which accustomed 
them to arbitrating between various factions and parties in ethno-political disputes. Officers 
WKDWKDYHSOD\HGNH\UROHVLQWKHDQGFRXSVG¶état were all former commanders 
of the Fijian UN battalion in Lebanon. Moreover, according to Scobell, the 1987 coup was also 
motivated by fears that a foreign policy of Non-Alignment promised by the incoming 
government would have snapped the )LMLDQDUP\¶V links with Western states and slashed its 
size.  
 
The Gambia$µFDVXDOW\¶RIUHJLRQDOSHDFHNHHSLQJ"  
 
Although the literature on Gambian peacekeeping is sparse, there is a consensus that it was 
participation in peacekeeping that was a proximate cause of the 1992 1994 coups in these 
countries, respectively. Herbert M. Howe even described tKH *DPELDQ FRXS DV µDQRWKHU
FDVXDOW\¶RIWKH1989-96 civil war in Liberia:67West Africa saw an intensive burst of regional 
coups in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.68 The Gambia had hitherto been a state that had 
enjoyed a multiparty, democratic and stable political system for a protracted period, albeit one 
that had (as the coup itself showed) been hollowed out by clientalism, patronage, and the 
monopolisation of power by Gambian independence leader Sir Dawda Jawara.   
 
The role that peacekeeping played in the 1994 coup was very direct: a failure to recompense 
military forces for their peacekeeping duties in Liberia exacerbated resentment in the military 
against the government and fed popular perceptions of government corruption. A government 
attempt to pre-empt a coup precipitated the coup itself. According to ex-peacekeeper and coup 
leader Yahyah Jammeh himself, it was the humiliating disarming of soldiers while awaiting 
the return of Jawara from a foreign visit that was the immediate trigger for the coup.69 The 
Gambian military itself was a fractious and youthful institution. Less than 15 years old when it 
seized power, the military had been created (ironically enough) to forestall coups in the 
aftermath of a failed 1981 coup by the prior, paramilitary national security force.  
 
The Gambian army had already endured disputes over pay prior to the peacekeeping mission 
to Liberia, resentment against Nigerian domination (the army was formed under the tutelage of 
senior Nigerian officers) all in the context of the increasingly fragile political structure of the 
country as a whole.70 In this case, peacekeeping ignited an already combustible situation rather 
than structuring the context, as occurred in Bangladesh and Fiji.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
 
Why did DDP breakdown in these three cases? 
 
So what, if any, consistent patterns or striking findings emerge across these cases, and what do 
they tell us about DDP? There is no evidence from these countries to suggest that entanglement 
in peacekeeping abroad mitigates the capacity of the military either to seize power or to sustain 
functions of domestic repression. The three cases give us no reason to assume that military 
forces confront steep trade-offs between these options. These cases also provide evidence of 
how integration into the global machinery of international peacekeeping may strengthen the 
military. In the cases of both Fiji and Bangladesh, as we see from Table 2 below, greater 
peacekeeping duties correspond with growth in the size of the armed forces. As we have seen, 
dependence on peacekeeping revenue may give the military a stake in sustaining a pro-
peacekeeping policy even to the extent of seizing power and ensuring that continued 
µHQWDQJOHPHQW¶:HDOVRVDZWKDWWKHµHQWDQJOHPHQW¶RIWKHPLOLWDU\LQWKHDSSDUDWXVRIJOREDO
peacekeeping effectively made the Bangladeshi political system more permeable to outside 
influences, correspondingly diminishing the power of the Bangladeshi demos. What these cases 
suggest is that entanglement is a weak predictor of positive feedback effects from participation 
in peacekeeping.  
 
What about socialisation? In as much as socialisation is a function of positively transforming 
military identities, then to whatever extent it exists it clearly did not succeed in these cases. In 
the case of the 1987 Fiji coup, exposure to ideas of anti-communism, suspicion of Non-
Alignment and fears of ethnic conflict empowered peacekeepers to overthrow democracy. 
These views resulted from participating in and training for peacekeeping. While communism 
and Non-Alignment have both disappeared, the case of Fiji nonetheless suggests that any 
feedback effects resXOWLQJIURPµVRFLDOLVDWLRQ¶WKURXJKSHDFHNHHSLQJDUHFRQWLQJHQWRQWKH
wider normative environment in the international system, and the content of those norms. 71 
Although anti-communism may no longer provide legitimacy for authoritarianism, the cases 
of both Fiji and Bangladesh suggest that the framework of international liberalism may still 
provide resources sufficient to motivate and justify military rule. The work of Maggie Dwyer 
on West African military deployments also shows that peacekeeping deployments provide 
socialisation experiences that can foster mutinies that can lead to military interference in 
politics, of which Gambia is an example.72  
 
Indeed, the scaling up of peacekeeping via peacebuilding into neo-trusteeship gives us no prima 
facia reason to think that peacekeeping eliminates praetorianism ± if the latter is understood in 
$PRV 3HUOPXWWHU¶V VHQVH RI D VRFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQ WKDW JHQHUDWHV SROLWLFDO OHDGHUVKLS73 The 
justificatory discourse attached to the Bangladeshi and Fijian coups in particular strikingly 
echoes that of international peacebuilding.74 Finally, it is also worth noting that the kind of 
activities that peacekeepers increasingly engage in are not dissimilar from the counter-
insurgency tasks performed by military forces under repressive regimes.75 Therefore we can 
safely say that, extreme as these cases are, they show that it would be naïve to assume that 
liberal peacebuilding necessarily inoculates peacekeepers against praetorianism (on which, see 
further below regarding leadership as a potential variable). Nor do we have to assume 
corruption or criminal behaviour in the field to motivate these conclusions. As we saw with the 
case of Fiji, even peacekeepers that maintain impeccable standards on their deployments 
abroad may still develop praetorian instincts if these norms enable militaries to slip the leash 
of national decision-making structures.  
 
All of this leads to the conclusion that if peacekeeping deployments abroad are to help 
consolidate democratic transition at home, clearly some other conditions need to be met that 
are not specified in DDP. What the evidence of these cases suggests is that, at the very least, 
the claims made for DDP need to be put on firmer ground, both through conceptual clarification 
(how diversionary peace is supposed to or could work), identification of a wider range of 
intervening variables, and more systematic efforts at process-tracing the feedback effects of 
peacekeeping operations across various levels of the contributing state and society.  
 
Further Collateral Effects of Peacekeeper Contribution 
 
More broadly then, how might these cases help us identity the possible negative feedback 
effects of peacekeeping on contributor states? After all, indirect military influence in politics 
may be more pernicious than outright military rule, because it would be more difficult to clarify 
political responsibility and to attribute political blame under such circumstances. In this section 
I shall identify possible variables from these three cases that contributed to military ruleThese 




As the cases of Bangladesh and Fiji indicate, significant revenue can be captured through 
peacekeeping. Malte Brosig sees in this the risk of µUHQWLHUSHDFHNHHSLQJ¶, in which rich donor 
countries effectively subsidise the militaries of developing states, with problematic 
consequences for their political systems.76 $V )LML DQG %DQJODGHVK LQGLFDWH µUHQWLHU
SHDFHNHHSLQJ¶QHHGQRWEHUHVWULFWHGWR$IULFDAlthough a quantitative measure, revenue is 
arguably the most difficult variable precisely to establish, given the difficulties in obtaining 
data or accurately measuring military expenditure as against (net) peacekeeping revenue. This 
difficulty is compounded by the fact that it is a question of proportion, and who secures access 
to the revenue. Estimating net earnings through peacekeeping as proportion of total military 
expenditure or alternatively as proportion of hard currency remittances, is an important but 
limited (because fairly gross) way of capturing the financial significance of peacekeeping. 
UltimatHO\ WKHGHJUHHRIDPLOLWDU\¶VILQDQFLDOGHSHQGHQFHRQSHDFHNHHSLQJLVDFRQWH[WXDO
question that will vary across countries. There is unlikely to be any ratio of peacekeeping 
revenue to military expenditure / remittances at which we will see greater military interference 
across all countries. It would be then worthwhile estimating how the financial benefits of 
peacekeeping are distributed across the military hierarchy.  
 
Additional questions here might include: how far do armed forces justify capital expenditure 
and arms purchases by reference to their peacekeeping activities? For example, in 2013 
Bangladesh signed a $1 billion agreement with Russia to buy combat helicopters, training 
aircraft and armoured personnel carriers, partially financed against excepted UN 
reimbursements.77 How far might a military use its peacekeeping to seek out further extra-
national revenue ± such as military aid from donor nations and allies? How far does 
peacekeeping hHOS WR VXSSRUW D µSHDFHNHHSLQJ-LQGXVWULDO FRPSOH[¶, given that large armed 
forces tend to constitute significant and potentially distorting concentrations of economic 
power? The effects here could be significant far short of military rule: a military that is 
dependent on extra-national sources of revenue might have a vested interest in perpetuating a 
particular pro-peacekeeping foreign policy independently of the choices of a civilian 
government as we saw in Fiji. More broadly, a military that is able to capture peacekeeping 
rents will have greater financial independence from civilian and elected leaders, and may 




The next commonality to emerge from all three cases is that all the coup leaders have been 
SHDFHNHHSHUV +RZ IDU WKHVH LQGLYLGXDOV¶ H[SHULHQFH RI SHDFHNHHSLQJ LQIOXHQFHG WKHLU
decision-making and outlook warrants further research. There are other instances of ex-
peacekeepers seizing power from democrats: General Pervez Musharaff ± a veteran of the UN 
missions in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina ± is perhaps the most notorious example.78 
Ghanaian strongman Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings would be another. But the wider 
significance of leadership as a variable would be to try and establish how far participation in 
peacekeeping may inculcate praetorianism within an officer corps. In the case of The Gambia 
for example, one possibility not suggested in the literature is that serving in a Nigerian-
dominated peacekeeping operation sharpened the disgruntlement of junior officers whose 
youthful army was being formed under the tutelage of Nigerian senior officers. In the case of 
Fiji, Baledrokadroka suggests that specific operational tasks in complex peacekeeping ± such 
as overseeing de-escalation between ethnonational factions ± engender praetorian attitudes that 
were subsequently visible in the military behaviour during the 1987 seizure of power. Although 
the newly integrated mission structure of modern peacekeeping operations enshrines the 
primacy of civil authority, the operational imperatives of complex peacebuilding and horizontal 
interaction between different forces in the field may help inculcate praetorian dispositions. 
Establishing whether there is any link between peacekeeping and praetorianism requires 
measuring how important peacekeeping is to the officer corps not only in terms of career 
progression and individual earnings, but also how far their identity and political outlook may 
be shaped by the experience of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  
 
1RUZRXOGWKLVQHHGWREHUHVWULFWHGWRWKHPLOLWDU\KRZIDUSHDFHNHHSLQJDIIHFWHGDFRXQWU\¶V
identity might also be significant. This could be gauged by how far politicians and leaders refer 
to and politically valourise peacekeeping. Biographical career data but also elite interviews and 
ethnographic fieldwork would help to establish how far the experience of peacekeeping and 
FRPSOH[SHDFHEXLOGLQJVKDSHVRIILFHUV¶LGHDVRIDXWKRULW\SROLWLFVDQGFLYLO-military relations. 
This is not simply a question of operational experience, but also of the content of training and 
UHFUXLWPHQW GHFLVLRQV DV :RUER\V¶ ZRUN RQ $UJHQWLQHDQ SHDFHNHHSLQJ GHPRQVWUDWHV79 
Training might provide links and contacts with other militaries that could facilitate leverage 
for external powers. But wider questions about peacekeeping emerge. How far can the content 
of peacekeeping training and operational experience be parlayed into functions of domestic 
repression and / or counter-insurgency? Many of the tasks peacekeepers perform in toda\¶V





Strikingly, peacekeeping and military size is distinctly correlated in two of the three cases. 
Controlling for other possible drivers of military growth, if peacekeeping is associated with a 
large military in peacetime, under democratic conditions and in the absence of any 
extraordinary security threat, this would suggest participation in peacekeeping is sustaining a 
disproportionately large military. Uruguay is another instance of this development.80 The 
impact of peacekeeping on military size could be further isolated by comparing peacekeeping-
intensive militaries to regional and global averages of military size. This is not only a question 
of military growth or size per capita, but also of the relative size of DFRXQWU\¶VSHDFHNHHSLQJ
complement. As Nurul Islam observes about Bangladesh, it is reasonable to infer that a 
consistently large peacekeeping deployment abroad suggests either a country is running down 
its defences by sustaining large foreign deployments, or these forces are simply excess over 
national concerns.81 A large military force, particularO\RQHWLHGWRDFRXQWU\¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO
identity and foreign policy, might skew civil-military relations in favour of the military, as well 
as possibly skewing economic development through the diversion of scare resources and 
labour. Finally, given the link that has been established between domestic repression and 
military size, if peacekeeping allows armies to sustain larger armies than they would otherwise 





























Table 1: Diversionary Peace in Bangladesh, Fiji and The Gambia 
 











Size of peacekeeping  
Deployment 
0 1,603 1,477 4,788 9,457 10,061 6,133 




107,000 121,000 137,000 126,000 157,053 157,050 
Military size per capita 0.87 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.86 0.99 0.96 
Peacekeepers as % of 
military 






Size of peacekeeping  
Deployment 
1,100 1,134 1,053 1,956 2,640 622 1,006 




3,900 3,600 3,500 3,500 3,500 3,500 
Military size per capita 6.72 5.09 4.56 4.28 3.87 3.96 3.90 
Peacekeepers as % of 
military 





Size of peacekeeping  
deployment 
N/A 0 0 19 223 201 419 
Size of the armed 
forces 
N/A 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Military size per capita N/A 0.84 0.70 0.61 0.49 0.44 0.42 
Peacekeepers as % of 
military  
N/A 0 0 2.3 27.8 25.1 52.3 
 
Source: The Military Balance, the World Bank. Note that peacekeeping deployments excludes forces deployed 
on no fly zones, maritime deployments, logistics units and field hospitals. Armed forces include army, air force, 
navy and marines. Peacekeepers defined as soldiers, police and military observers on both UN and non-UN 
missions. Military size per capita is measured as 1 per 1,000 head of population. Shaded cells show period of non-
democratic rule.   
 
The data in Table 2 suggest that in the cases of Bangladesh and Fiji, peacekeeping has helped 
to sustain the military in the face of transition: the per capita size of the Bangladeshi military 
has stayed roughly constant since the end oI*HQHUDO(UVKDG¶VUXOHDQGZKLOH%DQJODGHVKKDV
sustained large peacekeeping deployments abroad ± suggesting that the military is larger than 
may be necessary. The case of Fiji is even more extreme ± with an extraordinary proportion of 
its army deployed overseas as peacekeepers across periods of both democratic and military 
rule, even as the size of the military has declined from its height in the early 1990s. The Gambia 
provides an interesting contrast, with the size of the military deployment indicating either a) 
that Jammeh did QRWUHTXLUHWKHPLOLWDU\WRPDLQWDLQKLVUXOHHQMR\LQJWKHSURWHFWLRQRIµRQH
RIWKHPRVWIHDUHG¶VHFUHWSROLFHIRUFHVLQ$IULFD83 or b) that he engaged in coup-proofing-via-
peacekeeping. This possibility should remind us that diversionary peace may cut both ways ± 
DVWUDWHJ\RIµFRXS-SURRILQJ¶WKDWPLJKWEHDVHIIHFWLYHIRUGLFWDWRUVKLSDVIRUGHPRFUDF\,I
peacekeeping does work as a coup-proofing strategy for both democracies and dictatorships, 




One particularly striking finding that emerges in the case of Bangladesh and Fiji was that 
peacekeeping provided external leverage for Western actors to manipulate WKRVH FRXQWULHV¶
politics for their own interests via the medium of the UN. This suggests a readiness and capacity 
on the part of elements of the UN to intervene in the politics of its contributor states on behalf 
of Western states. The possibility of shutting Fiji out of peacekeeping was repeatedly seen as 
a way of forestalling the 2006 coup and then subsequently pressurizing the coup government. 
Prior to the coup, Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase sought to pre-empt the coup by saying it 
ZRXOG WKUHDWHQ WKH PLOLWDU\¶V SHDFHNHHSLQJ UHYHQXH ZKLOH )LMLDQ civil servants feared that 
VDQFWLRQV DJDLQVW )LML¶V SHDFHNHHSLQJ UROH ZRXOG KDUGHQ WKH PLOLWDU\¶V DWWLWXGH.84 After the 
FRXS )LMLDQ 03V LQVLVWHG WKDW SHDFHNHHSLQJ ZDV WKH FRXS JRYHUQPHQW¶s weakness, and 
pressured Western allies to shut Fiji out of peacekeeping, to no avail.85  
 
An assessment as to the significance of peacekeeping in providing external leverage would 
need to be put into context alongside other possible levers of external influence (e.g., aid). It 
also seems reasonable to infer from the case of Bangladesh that peacekeeping enhanced 
external leverage by the fact that it lowered the political costs of military intervention into the 
political process that it could be mediated through an international organisation rather than a 
national government and in the case of Bangladesh it allowed donor states to threaten key 
sources of national revenue without slashing aid or development funding. The fact that the 
Bangladeshi military did not intervene in 2014 election crisis offers something like a natural 
H[SHULPHQW UHJDUGLQJ PLOLWDU\ LQWHUIHUHQFH LQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V SROLWLFV ,W DJDLQ VXJJHVWV WKDW
Dessallien played a crucial role in legitimising the coup, as the UN subsequently intervened 
directly in the political crisis through the good offices of Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, who served 
at the time as Assistant-Secretary General in the UN Department of Political Affairs, 
suggesting that UNHQ wished to ensure there was to be no more freelancing by locally-based 






Exploring the feedback effects of peacekeeping on peacekeeper-contributing states is a logical 
next phase for peacekeeping scholarship. Returning back to the aims of the article, we see that 
in each case peacekeeping was a necessary but insufficient condition of military rule. A 
possible threat to peacekeeping revenue helped motivate coups in Bangladesh and Fiji, while 
the stress of deployment precipitated military rule in the West African cases. Further common 
patterns concern that complex peacebuilding may enhance praetorian instincts. Finally a range 
of variables were identified as relevant to potential negative feedback effects of peacekeeping, 
notably revenue, leadership, military size and leverage, as well as suggestions of how these 
might work to transmit such effects.  
 
In light of the three cases reviewed in this article, it is evident that the stakes of such research 
are high. Even if it is carried out under the blue flag, peacekeeping connects to a range of power 
structures, and the global deployment of peacekeepers treats not only of the armed power of 
the state and civil-military relations but also of the vitality and sustainability of democratic rule 
and civilian government in the developing world. Exceptional as these cases are, they are 
sufficient to show that the conventional wisdom that assumes that liberal internationalism, 
peacekeeping and domestic democracy are all mutually reinforcing cannot be taken as a given. 
Indeed, the idea that deploying forces abroad helps to strengthen democracy at home must, 
logically speaking, be predicated on the fragility of democracy in the peacekeeper-contributing 
states. Democratic notions of diversionary peace are premised on the idea that democratic order 
is not a function of the vitality and design of democratic institutions or the extent of popular 
participation and representation in political life, but rather is a function of military behaviour. 
In short the logic of the theory alone should lead us not to vest too much hope in the purported 
benefits of military operations abroad in helping to maintain democracy at home, as the theory 
itself presupposes democratic frailty.   
 
The question of feedback effects from peacekeeping ties together plenty of important new 
themes in IR: theories of identity transformation at the state and sub-state level, the processes 
through which norms are disseminated and localised, the globalisation and convergence of 
certain kinds of military behaviour and the connections between regime-type and use of force. 
All of these questions are all the more important given the growth in non-traditional uses of 
force that legally and politically (if not always in actuality) fall short of warfare, such as 
peacekeeping. IR research needs to go beyond traditional state-centric models regarding the 
use of force in order to better capture the globalisation of peacekeeping and the new 
institutional forms through which military power is applied. It is hoped that the investigation 
in this article will contribute to this goal.     
 
Ten years ago the Economist hailed the UN for KDYLQJVWXPEOHGDFURVVµDQLQJHQLRXVWRRORI
diplomacy. Using lucrative peacekeeping contracts as leverage, it could influence the providers 
RISHDFHNHHSHUVʊDQGSHUKDSVPRUHHIIHFWLYHO\WKDQLWFRXOGLQIOXHQFHWKHSUREOHP-nations to 
which WKRVHSHDFHNHHSHUVZRXOGEHVHQW¶86 Judging by the record of the Bangladeshi 2007-08 
state of emergency, there appear to be few reasons to celebrate WKH81¶VFDSDFLW\WRPDQLSXODWH
domestic political systems through military interference. Given how social science has 
compromised itself in the past with regards to naïve expectations of military rule, it is all the 
more important that praetorianism be subjected to critical scrutiny, even when it takes on the 
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